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Abstract. The organization of US presidential elections make them potentially 
vulnerable to so-called “voting paradoxes”, identified by social choice theorists 
but rarely documented empirically.  The presence of a record high number of 
candidates in the 2016 Republican Party presidential primaries may have made 
this possibility particularly latent.  Using polling data from the primaries we 
identify two possible cases: Early in the pre-primary (2015) a cyclical majority 
may have existed in Republican voters’ preferences between Bush, Cruz and 
Walker—thereby giving a rare example of the Condorcet Paradox.  
Furthermore, later polling data (March 2016) suggests that while Trump (who 
achieved less than 50% of the total Republican primary vote) was the Plurality 
Winner, he could have been beaten in pairwise contests by at least one other 
candidate—thereby exhibiting a case of the Borda Paradox.  The cases confirm 
the empirical relevance of the theoretical voting paradoxes and the importance 
of voting procedures. 
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Donald Trump; Scot Walker; voting system. 
JEL-codes: D71; D72. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1950s social choice theory has questioned the possibility of 
aggregating individual preferences to straightforward, meaningful 
collective choices (Arrow [1951] 1963).  Most well-known are two so-
called “voting paradoxes” named after the French mathematicians 
Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet 
(1743-1794) and Jean-Charles de Borda (1733-1799) (McLean and 
Urken 1995). The Borda Paradox occurs when a plurality of voters 
prefer A to B and C, but where B or C (or both) can beat A in 
pairwise match-ups.  The Condorcet Paradox exists when there is a 
                                           
1 I am grateful to Daniel Bochsler for useful comments. 
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so-called “cyclical majority” between three or more alternatives 
when compared head-to-head, so that A beats B, and with the latter 
beating a third, C, but where C also beats A.  In both situations there 
is no stable or consistent choice: Whatever is chosen as the outcome 
depends as much on the sequence (or form) of voting as on the 
preferences of the voters.  As such both paradoxes deal with 
situations where there is a seeming discrepancy between what a 
majority of the voters would prefer and what the actual outcome is. 
Since the rediscovery of the paradoxes in the 20th century (Arrow 
[1951] 1963; Black [1958] 1998), social scientists have devoted 
considerable efforts to proving their empirical relevance, first and 
foremost the late William H. Riker  (e.g., Riker 1982; Riker 1986).  
However, the empirical examples identified by Riker and others (cf. 
Nurmi 1999; Gehrlein 2006; Van Deemen 2014; Kaminski 2015: 371ff) 
have occasionally been criticized for being anecdotal or empirically 
weak, etc., and often relying on speculative configurations of 
preferences (Green and Shapiro 1994; Mackie 2003). 
One of the problems of the entire field is that even if voting 
paradoxes exist in the voter preferences underlying social choices, 
these may not be easily visible, or even visible at all, given that 
observers very rarely have detailed information about the decision-
makers’ preference orderings over the relevant alternatives.  Even 
when survey data exists it rarely includes pairwise comparisons or 
complete rankings of all the relevant candidates or policies.  For that 
reason alone, scholars of empirical social choice have very often had 
to rely on more or less speculative reconstructions of the preferences 
(Kaminski 2015: 367ff).  In other cases where scholars are fortunate 
to have data on voter preferences, these in reality deal with 
hypothetical scenarios of modest empirical relevance, e.g., 
preferences over prime ministers where such are not directly elected 
(Kurrild-Klitgaard 2001) or over political parties in a system of 
proportional representation (Kurrild-Klitgaard 2004; Kurrild-
Klitgaard 2008). 
However, the practical organization of the US presidential 
election process should make it an eminently suitable setting for the 
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study of the possible empirical occurrence of voting paradoxes.  For 
both major parties, Democrats and Republicans, the primary process 
involves various forms of plurality voting (although in different 
forms at different stages), among the registered voters of the parties 
(or among broader groups of voters), and where the winner of the 
individual primary (or caucus) is the candidate with most votes, but 
with no requirement of an absolute majority of the votes cast.  The 
election process also includes sequential decisions (state by state in 
the primaries followed by a general election among the voters in all 
states). 
Since voters in US presidential elections usually have more than 
two alternatives to choose between, both in the parties’ primaries 
and in the general election, the selection of a nominees and 
subsequently of a president who might be beaten by one or more 
other candidates if compared in pairwise head-to-head match-ups 
would seem to be at least a theoretical possibility.  There are reasons 
to believe that this, or even “cyclical majorities” between three or 
more candidates may have occurred in some US presidential 
elections (Riker 1982; Riker 1986; cf. Van Deemen 2014; Kurrild-
Klitgaard 2014).  Furthermore, given that the voters voting in the 
individual primaries, as well as in the general election, are not 
identical sets of decision-makers, there is ripe possibility for 
inconsistent social choices even if the individual preferences are 
consistent and the individual stages unproblematic (cf. Brams, 
Kilgour and Zwicker 1998; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2013).  And this is even 
without including the potential problems arising from the existence 
of the Electoral College (Miller 2011; Miller 2012). 
 The present note is not meant as an in-depth, academic treatment 
of the topic but merely as a brief note using some simple polling 
data from the period leading up to and the beginning of the 2016 US 
presidential election in order to illustrate the empirical relevance of 
the theoretical claims of social choice analysis. 
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2. Voter preferences in the GOP primary field 2015-16 
 
It is really only possible to conclude on the actual presence of voting 
paradoxes in democratic decisions if there exist voting situations or 
polls where voters are asked to compare the candidates pairwise or 
to rank or score them (cf., e.g., Regenwetter et al. 2006; Kurrild-
Klitgaard 2014).  But even though the use of polling in elections has 
increased almost exponentially in recent decades, very few polls are 
conducted using other methods than a form of plurality—i.e., 
almost all pit all candidates judged to be relevant against each other 
in one big field and with every respondent given one “vote”.  Polls 
using ranking data are occasionally found in larger election surveys, 
e.g., through “thermometer” evaluations of parties or politicians 
(e.g., Feld and Grofman 1992; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2008; Bochsler 
2010), but head-to-head comparisons are rarely seen (cf. Van 
Deemen 2014). 
 In the lead up to and during the 2016 presidential election in the 
US there seems to have been only four polls published using head-
to-head comparisons between more than the two leading 
candidates, and only two of these pitted all candidates considered 
against everyone else in pairwise comparisons thus allowing to 
draw inferences about social orderings.2 
 
No Condorcet Winner 
Among the latter was a Monmouth University Poll, conducted 30 
March – 2 April 2015, asking for comparisons of four Republican 
presidential candidates: fmr. Gov. Jeb Bush, Gov. Chris Christie, 
Senator Ted Cruz and Gov. Scott Walker.  Because the poll was 
taken so long before the primaries it did not include Donald Trump 
who only declared his candidacy later that year but focused on four 
                                           
2 The surveys were a) Monmouth University Poll 30 March – 2 April 2015; b) 
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll (Hart Research Associates & Public Opinion 
Strategies, 14 – 16 February 2016; c) ditto, 3 – 6 March 2016; d) ABC 
News/Washington Post Poll 3 – 5 March 2016 (all available through 
pollingreport.com). 
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declared candidates widely seen to be serious contenders at the 
time.  The poll results are shown in detail in Table 1, with the 
relevant p-values for differences in vote shares calculated and 
added. 
 
Table 1. Head-to-head match-ups, four Republican presidential candidates, 
March-April 2015. T-test. 
 Candidates 
(vote shares) 
 P-value of vote 
share difference 
Jeb Bush 
(54%) 
      **** Chris Christie 
(28%) 
0.0000 
Jeb Bush 
(49%) 
 Ted Cruz 
(40%) 
0.0718 
Ted Cruz 
(55%) 
       **** Chris Christie 
(30%) 
0.0000 
Ted Cruz 
(41%) 
 Scott Walker 
(36%) 
0.2830 
Scott Walker 
(46%) 
 Jeb Bush 
(42%) 
0.4219 
Scott Walker 
(58%) 
       **** Chris Christie 
(26%) 
0.0000 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; **** p<0.005; **** p<0.001.  Two-tailed. 
Source: Monmouth University Poll. 30 March – 2 April, 2015. N=355 
registered voters nationwide who are Republicans or lean Republican. 
(pollingreport.com). 
Question: "If the only two candidates for the Republican nomination were …, who 
would you choose?" 
 
The poll results suggest that there was a cyclical majority between 
three of the four candidates, such that Walker would beat Bush, who 
would beat Cruz who would beat Walker.  In other words, there 
was no Condorcet Winner—someone who could not be beaten by at 
least one other candidate.  However, there was a Condorcet Loser: 
All other candidates could individually beat Christie in head-to-
head match-ups. 
However, it should be noted that the sample of voters is so 
relatively small (N=355) that for several of the pairwise comparisons 
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we cannot, at conventional levels of statistical significance, say with 
any certainty what the majority relations would be for the 
population of GOP voters—i.e., we cannot rule out that the relation 
identified here is a function of sample composition rather than a 
reflection of the preferences of the GOP electorate as a whole (cf. 
Regenwetter, Adams and Grofman 2002).  The possible majority 
relations (those apparent in the poll’s vote shares but not statistically 
significant) as well as the likely majority relations (those found to be 
statistically significant) are summarized in Figure 1, where full lines 
refer to the latter and broken lines to the former.  But while we 
cannot say with conventional degrees of certainty that there was a 
cycle in the preferences of the GOP electorate, we can say that it 
appears that was one. 
  
Figure 1. The possible majority cycle between Bush, Christie, Cruz and Walker, 
March-April 2015. 
  Walker   
     
     
  Christie   
     
Cruz    Bush 
Source: See Table 1. 
 
Plurality Winner but Condorcet Loser 
The second poll allowing for pairwise comparisons of the 
candidates came almost a year later, in March 2016 just while the 
primaries were really taking off.  An ABC News/Washington Post 
Poll conducted 3 – 5 March, 2016, pitted the then remaining GOP 
candidates against each other: Senator Ted Cruz, Gov. John Kasich, 
Senator Marco Rubio and business tycoon Donald Trump.  The poll 
did not conduct a full set of head-to-head comparisons, but rather 
first pitted the four candidates against each other in one field, with 
Trump coming out the Plurality Winner (34%) followed by Cruz 
(25%), Rubio (18%) and Kasich (13%).  Secondly, the survey then 
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compared Trump in head-to-head contests with Cruz and Rubio 
respectively, but with Kasich omitted.  Here Trump was beaten by 
both Cruz and Rubio.  The results are given in detail in Table 2, with 
the relevant p-values calculated and added. 
 
Table 2. Poll results, including partial head-to-head match ups, four Republican 
presidential candidates, March 2016. T-test. 
A. Candidate Vote share  P-value of vote 
share relative to 
Plurality 
Winner 
Donald Trump 34%   
Ted Cruz   25%*   0.0188 
Marco Rubio       18%****   0.0000 
John Kasich       13%****   0.0000 
Other   4%   
    
B. Candidates 
(vote shares) 
 P-value of vote 
share difference 
Ted Cruz 
(54%) 
  ** Donald Trump 
(41%) 
0.0074 
Marco Rubio 
(51%) 
 Donald Trump 
(45%) 
0.2205 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; **** p<0.005; **** p<0.001.  Two-tailed. 
Source: ABC News/Washington Post Poll. 3 – 6 March, 2016. N=400 registered 
voters nationwide who are Republicans or lean Republican 
(pollingreport.com). 
Question A.: "Who would you like to see win the Republican nomination for 
president this year: Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Marco Rubio, or Donald Trump?".  
Question B.: "What if the choice was just between Trump and Cruz? Who would 
you like to see win?" or "What if the choice was just between Trump and Rubio? 
Who would you like to see win?". 
 
Because the survey does not include Kasich and does not compare 
Cruz and Rubio in head-to-head match-ups, we cannot conclude 
anything on the possible presence of a cyclical majority.  However, 
we can glean enough from the poll to conclude that it exhibits a case 
of the Borda Paradox: While Trump beat the three others in a 
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comparison of all of them simultaneously, he would lose to (at least) 
two of them in pairwise contests.  So, while we do not know who (if 
any) would have been the Condorcet Winner among GOP voters, 
we know that it would not have been the same as the one who was 
the Plurality Winner in both the poll and the actual primary 
(Trump). 
 
Table 3. Poll results, including partial head-to-head match ups, four Republican 
presidential candidates, March 2016. T-test. 
A. Candidate Vote share  P-value of vote 
share relative to 
Plurality 
Winner 
Donald Trump 30%   
Ted Cruz 27%   0.4286 
John Kasich   22%*   0.0267 
Marco Rubio      20%***   0.0047 
    
B.  Candidates 
(vote shares) 
 P-value of vote 
share difference 
Ted Cruz 
(57%) 
    **** Donald Trump 
(40%) 
0.0005 
John Kasich 
(57%) 
    **** Donald Trump 
(40%) 
0.0005 
Marco Rubio 
(56%) 
  ** Donald Trump 
(43%) 
0.0090 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; **** p<0.005; **** p<0.001.  Two-tailed. 
Source: NBC News/Wall Street Journal (Hart Research Associates & Public 
Opinion Strategies). 3 – 6 March, 2016. N=397 Republican primary voters 
nationwide (pollingreport.com). 
Question A.: "And, if the Republican primary for president were being held today, 
which one of the following candidates would you favor: [see below]?".  
Question B.: "Now, if you had to choose between ONLY Donald Trump and [see 
below] in the Republican primary for president, which one would you favor?". 
 
 We are again, as in the previous poll (Table 1), faced with the 
partial challenge that not all the candidates’ vote shares are 
statistically different from each other at conventional levels of 
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significance.  Trump beats Cruz, Kasich and Rubio with comfortable 
margins (A.), but in the head-to-head comparisons (B.) the 
difference in the sample between Rubio (51%) and Trump (45%) is 
so relatively small, when the number of respondents is considered 
(N=400), that we cannot with certainty generalize to the Republican 
electorate as a whole.  However, this finding does not undermine 
the central finding here: Given that Cruz beats Trump comfortably 
(54% to 41%), we still have a case of the Borda Paradox occurring. 
At exactly the same dates as the ABC News/Washington Post Poll 
(3-6 March 2016) another survey was conducted for NBC News/Wall 
Street Journal, with an almost identical but more exhaustive method 
and producing very similar results, albeit much clearer.  Section A. 
of Table 3 again pits all candidates considered against each other, 
with Trump again being a (relatively narrow) Plurality Winner 
(30%) against Cruz (27%), this time with Kasich as no. 3 (22%) and 
Rubio closely thereafter as fourth (20%). 
Together the polls provide strong evidence that during the 
primaries, or at least in March 2016—a very crucial time in the GOP 
primary—Trump may have simultaneously been the Plurality 
Winner and the Borda Loser, or at least would have lost to at least 
one other contender in pairwise contests. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Most of the time polls do not allow for social choice analysis, 
because they are not framed in a way enabling analysts to establish 
the rankings of the alternatives, and this generally held true for the 
2016 US presidential primaries and general election too.  All the 
more interesting is it therefore that of the few polls that did, there 
seems to be several indications that voting paradoxes may have 
been present.  A cyclical majority between a set of top-ranked 
candidates may very likely have existed in Republican voter 
preferences early on in the pre-primary season, and Donald Trump, 
who went on to win both the GOP nomination and the presidential 
election itself, could have been beaten in head-to-head contests if 
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such had been used early on in the primaries.  This is all the more 
interesting and consequential given that Trump won less than 50% 
of the vote both in the GOP nomination contest and in the 
presidential election itself. 
That Trump could win despite being a Borda Loser is no doubt 
due to the historically large number of candidates in the GOP field:  
There seems to be a well-established tendency for larger sets of 
alternatives to increase the probability of, e.g., cyclical majorities 
occurring (cf. Gehrlein and Fishburn 1976; Radcliff 1994; Jones et al. 
1995).  However, the outcome was also due to the process: Had the 
primary process involved either head-to-head contests or one or 
more run-offs between the contenders, it is quite plausible that 
Trump would not have won the nomination and therefore not 
become president. 
As such the present research lends empirical credibility to the 
hotly debated proposition in political science and political economy 
that voter preferences collective choices may take such shapes that 
paradoxical outcomes may prevail.  Specifically, that there is an at 
least non-trivial possibility that the preferences of US voters at the 
onset of the 2016 presidential election may have looked in manner 
reminiscent of the problems identified by Condorcet, Arrow and 
Riker.  To the extent this is true, it represents one of the few 
empirically supported examples of one or more cycles between 
alternative candidates and yet another example of the Borda 
Paradox (cf. Gehrlein and Lepelley 2011).  In fact, the character of 
the empirical matter makes the cases considered stronger than most 
of the historical examples examined by Riker (1982; 1986), which did 
not rely on “hard” data but mostly on hypotheses about what the 
preferences may have looked like.  Furthermore, it is a clear, non-
contrived real-world example demonstrating that the way real social 
choices are made may end up having significant consequences for 
the election outcomes.  In this way the simple polling data 
considered demonstrate the potential instability of social choices, 
and that this is not just a theoretical phenomenon but a genuine 
empirical possibility—with far-reaching consequences. 
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